

CRISIS NOTES

Skybolt

SKYBOLT

US actions implied intention to proceed "without actually committing."
prior consultation.

Nov 5 PT to McN: note British press report on
"first production order for Skybolt." Knowing
importance ... welcome news indeed.

Oct 2, 1962

Rusk: Europeans aren't prepared to use nukes early.
[Can they pretend?]

[What is current capability for limiting the nuclear
war?] (targeting, basing, alert, SO)

Rusk

Mac: As a consequence we are forced to make statements
about our willingness to behave irrationally, like
going to nuclear war, as Mr. McN did on returning from
Europe recently.

McN: That's right.

Taylor

Nitzel, Finkler: Charge Pub. Dir. (14/2!)

MN: not sure; We have been trying to charge the facts, not the

Dir.

Failure to pass info

" " seek & obtain feedback.

When Chiefs worked without Indians, failed to seek feedback.

Aug 24: Hitch-Brown with McN; on basis of studies, counsel Shy; but not then: wait till budget (make points but it break in 1).

So as not to telegraph punch (to USAF, Congress); release production funds (did in Sept.), but only month-by-month. Enthoven-Rubel told, no order.

McN from PT - to RAF - to USAF in Sept.

PRitz told late Sept.

Budget Bureau, Oct. 15. Cuba.

26 Oct (Cuba): Bell memo to Bundy.

31 Oct: Rogers to Ritz & Pyler.

2 Nov: BNA desk memo to Pres.

5 Nov. PT to McN. Same day, draft of Pk. I from McN to VCS.

7 Nov: McN, R, McG, JFK, Ritz Shy missing. Chiefs to reply by 20 Nov.

McN: all take care of it.

8 Nov McN to Gore.

9 Nov McN to Thorn.

(PT: ^{McN} agree. Advance notice. Inland would wish to consider sub-launched missile.)

PT: I did more than intimate. I used the word
Pol. ... said thought we'd have to start from there)

12 Nov McN to Bruce.

9 Nov ISA studies start — end 23 Nov.

20 Nov JCS comments. (Taylor, endorsed drop; separate memo.)

23 Nov. Higgins Part: McN, Bill, Bundy, Wiener. JFK
canceled "subject to consult. with UK on altm."

8 Sept = Dear Bob letter to McN, ISA.

(don't expand special relationship) (to Pol).

McN ignored; Ruge irritated. (judged R not sincere).

PN wanted more special rel, to help ^{UK} slide to neutral.

Upgrade French to same; bilateral arrangements,
spokes in a wheel.

But ISA felt inhibited.

23 Nov: BSR, Bonnie Owen, Schatzel, Weiss. (predicted Pol.!
all demanded).

24 Nov. Dear Bob. (~~and~~ no Pol; no aid on sky).

PT: couldn't favor Pol ~~to~~ on principle; only if
no alternative.

Had to say: sky out, Pol certain.

(McN must say).

Hockaday, sec.

Feared to ask McN: McN- USAF-RAF.

(Went personal position.)

Threat wanted to sustain claim of deterrent.

15 Nov PM to ~~JFK~~ Gov. to JFK

11 Dec. PT to McN

16 Dec McN, JFK, Ball, etc.

17 Dec press conf.

18 Novem.

19 Dec. JFK-McN

20.

Silvan Tompkins: Affect, Imagery + Consciousness

Springer Publishing, N.Y., 1963

2 vols.

Skybolt: COMM

Regard comm as difficult, misinterpretation likely,
correction difficult.

Don't rely just on feedback to message — may be
too late, after misinterpretation has occurred.

[Thornycroft, after MCN reading. Did it occur to
him that MCN might have better offers all ready?
Why closer anger? Could he help it? Could he have
indicated more clearly that he was angry at inadequacy of
offers, failure to support deterrent, rather than Skybolt?

Did T really expect a generous offer? Did he
test beforehand? Could he?

[I was not so wrong in believing T was ^{not feeling} ~~shame~~
surprise & rage — though wrong in thinking he didn't act it.]

What hypotheses are they testing? Is correct one included?

Test beforehand to find out possible interpretations:

Ask, not just "How will they take it? What will they do?"
but "What will it mean to them? How will they interpret it?"
Regard their interpretation — not just their response — as uncertain.